

Yaroslav MARCHENKO

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Professor of the Department of TSD

Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi

National Army Academy

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7259-8521>

e-mail: jaroslavmarchenko@ukr.net

VOVCHUKHIV OPERATION OF THE UKRAINIAN HALYCHYNA'S ARMY (1919): BACKGROUND, PROGRESS, AFTERMATH

The formation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1918, was a natural consequence of the long-standing struggle of Ukrainians of Halychyna for statehood. In a difficult situation of the Ukrainian-Polish war 1918–1919, started by Poland, the West Ukrainian People's Republic carried out state and military formation. Close relations with the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) were established; the Ukrainian Halychyna's Army (UHA) was reorganized on the European way and was ready for the West Ukrainian People's Republic armed defense. It was proved that compared to the Polish state, the military potential of the Ukrainians was much weaker. However, a bright demonstration of the UHA's combat readiness was the Vovchukhiv Strategic Offensive Operation in February–March 1919, which put the Polish troops in Lviv, in particular, and in Halychyna, in general in a tough situation.

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the background of the Vovchukhiv operation, its course, and the causes of UHA's defeat. The author states that two factors caused the UHA's offensive strategic operation in February 1919. Firstly, the reorganization of the West Ukrainian People's Republic armed forces with weighty strengthening increased their combat capability and readiness for offensive operations. Also, the hard work of governing structures increased morale and combat capabilities of the army. The military successes of the Ukrainian troops, which caused worry and panic in Warsaw, are described. It is noted that the break in the fightings, organized by the Entente mission, was successfully used by the Polish command to reinforcement on the Halychyna Front with reserves from abroad. Specific examples show that in spring 1919, UHA brigades were forced to resist the numerically larger Polish forces. Because of this, they soon lost the results of the offensive operation.

Keywords: West Ukrainian People's Republic, Ukrainian Halychyna's Army, Poland, Vovchukhiv operation, Polish-Ukrainian war.

One of the most important events of the Polish-Ukrainian war 1918–1919 was the Vovchukhiv operation of the Ukrainian Halychyna's Army (UHA), which is still shrouded in numerous myths and legends. In the current socio-political situation, the comprehensive

coverage of the West Ukrainian People's Republic history and its struggle for Ukrainian independence and unity is of particular relevance. The issue of consolidation of the Ukrainian nation, the population of the East and the West has become an urgent demand of time and requires, among other measures, widespread information activity, in particular in the field of national historical thought. At this point, the objective reproduction of the key events of the Ukrainian-Polish war 1918–1919, first of all, of the UHA's Vovchukhiv operation will promote Ukraine's deliberated and balanced approach to relations with democratic Poland.

In a deep crisis in Austria-Hungary, caused by defeats on the fronts, growth of a national-liberation movement of the peoples of the empire for independence, on October 18–19, 1918 in Lviv took place a representative meeting of Ukrainian ambassadors to the Vienna Parliament and Halychyna and Bukovyna regional Seims, activists of parties and bishops who elected a temporary parliament – the Ukrainian National Council, headed by lawyer Ye. Petrushevych.

When there was a real threat of the Poles' seizure of power in the region and its annexation to Poland, the Central Military Committee, headed by the Otaman of the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS) D. Vitovskyi, convinced branch manager of the Ukrainian National Council (UPRada) in Lviv, K. Levytskyi, to take over power in Lviv and the counties on the night of November 1, 1918, by force of arms. «If we do not take Lviv tonight, it will probably be taken by Poles tomorrow»¹, he resolutely declared to cautious members of the Council.

On November 1, 1918, the Ukrainians seized power in Lviv², which allowed UPRada to proclaim the formation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic on November 9. «In general, the Ukrainian military authorities coped with their mission famously», wrote a participant of those historical events O. Kuzma. «The diligence of the Ukrainian officers and soldiers was exemplary»³. In the region began state and military building, which took place in the circumstances of armed conflict in Lviv, which, following direct intervention by Poland, developed into a Ukrainian–Polish war.

Colonel D. Vitovskyi was appointed State Secretary of Military Affairs. The supreme authority of the armed forces of the republic became the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Halychyna's Army (NK UHA), led by Colonels H. Kossak and H. Stefaniv during the battles for Lviv after D. Vitovskyi, and since December 10, 1918, an experienced UPR Army General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko. Due to their efforts, 12 reserve infantry regiments were created at the end of the year in Sambir, Stryi, Kolomyia. 4 spare gun regiments in Stryi, Stanyslaviv, Kolomyia, Zolochiv. 2 cavalry, communications, sappers and senior schools were set up in Sambir, Zolochiv, Kolomyia, Stanyslaviv⁴.

During the street battles in the capital of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, on November 20, 1918, a powerful fighting group of Polish troops of Lieutenant Colonel M. Tokarzhevskyi (8,3 thousand soldiers and officers, 61 machine guns and 45 guns) arrived from Peremyshl, which allowed the Poles to take the offensive. Under pressure from enemy's forces twice the strength advantage that had been overwhelming one and a half

¹ Кузьма О. Листопадові дні 1918 р. Львів, 2003. С. 51.

² Krotofil M. *Ukraińska Armia Halicka 1918–1920*. Torun, 2002. S. 31, 37.

³ Кузьма О. Листопадові дні 1918 р. С. 70.

⁴ Шанковський Л. *Українська Галицька Армія*. Львів, 1999. С. 52, 53.

times, Colonel H. Stefaniv ordered to leave Lviv on November 22, but the fighting on the front did not stop⁵.

In early December 1918, several local operations were carried out at the front on the initiative of individual commanders of battle groups, which, however, did not lead to the regaining control over Lviv⁶. The failure of the first Lviv charge in late December 1918⁷ caused the dissatisfaction of the republic leadership. The West Ukrainian People's Republic government has set out to prepare and repeat the operation in January 1919. This step was due to the departure of the united UPR delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, which opened on January 18. The liberation of Lviv should have raised the weight and prestige of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in the international arena. In January 1919, in the Lviv outskirts, fierce, bloody fighting started again⁸.

After the reorganization and substantial strengthening of the Halychyna's army and the establishment of a close alliance with the UPR, the West Ukrainian People's Republic leadership and the UHA command were determined to make a turning point in the Ukrainian-Polish war. Above all, they wanted to liberate the capital of the republic – Lviv. The situation at the front facilitated this: in early February 1919, the UHA, the total number of which reached 60 thousand, of which about 37 thousand in the combat force, was almost equal to the number of Poles, which had about 39 thousand soldiers in combat units. It intercepted the initiative from the Poles, successfully repulsed several of their attempts to advance in the area of Bartativ, Velykyi Liubin, and the north wing of the front⁹.

The new chief of UHA staff, Colonel V. Kurmanovych, outlined the plan of strategic offensive prepared by the experienced colonels of the General Staff Ye. Myshkivskiy and M. Kakurin, which met the requirements of the war strategy. However, a lively discussion has been developed around it. The plan was to strike the main blow by the 3rd Corps: 1st Brigade of USS, 7th Lviv, and 8th Sambir Brigades. By decisive offensive at Sudova Vyshnia-Horodok section, troops had to go to the Peremyshl–Lviv railway, cut the connection of Polish Lviv unit with Peremyshl, then defeat the Horodok group of Polish troops, conquer the city and completely block Lviv. The balance of forces in the direction of the main blow was as follows: Colonel Serdy's Horodok Group had 142 officers and 2 236 gunners, 40 machine guns and 16 guns. General Zielinskiy's Sudova Vyshnia Group – about 4 000 soldiers and 24 guns. The Ukrainian brigades had: 1st brigade of the USS Otaman A. Bizants on the Horodok direction – 2 100 soldiers. The 7th Lviv and 8th Sambir Brigades (2 500 soldiers) led the attack on the Sudova Vyshnia–Vovchukhy, where the group of General Zielinskiy (4 000 soldiers and 24 guns) defended. In total, the 3rd Corps launched an offensive in the main direction of 9 800 soldiers¹⁰.

⁵ Литвин М. Українсько-польська війна 1918–1919 рр. Львів, 1998. С. 133, 135, 140.

⁶ Кравс А. Зав'язок і бої «Групи Хирів». *Українська Галицька Армія: Матеріали до історії*. Вінніпег, 1960. Т. 2. С. 55–57.

⁷ Литвин М. Українсько-польська війна 1918–1919 рр. С. 236.

⁸ Микитюк Д. Організаційна структура Української Галицької Армії. *Українська Галицька Армія: Матеріали до історії*. Вінніпег, 1958. Т. 1. С. 78–79.

⁹ Карпинець І. Галичина: військова історія 1914–1921. Львів, 2005. С. 134–135.

¹⁰ Литвин М. Українсько-польська війна 1918–1919 рр. С. 328–330.

The plan of a new strategic offensive operation, which is known in the history of the war as Vovchukhiv operation, developed by the NK UHA, was supposed to make a powerful frontal strike on the main direction – the Sudova Vyshnia–Horodok railway line with Colonel A. Kravs' forces. At the same time, support him with the operations of other Halychian brigades – by rapidly projecting mobile groups into the flank and enemy's rear, to prevent the moving of Poles troops from the other front areas to the main strike area of the troops of the 3rd Halychian Corps. «I pointed out, – the General recalled, – that we would never reach positive consequences by head attacks, but instead, striking the Peremyshl–Lviv line, when we are standing firmly in the area of Rava-Ruska–Belz–Sokal, should put the main Polish forces at risk of being cut off, thereby forcing the Poles to the struggle to the point of exhaustion. That's when, in my opinion, it would be possible to hit Lviv directly...»¹¹.

As was planned, on February 17, 1919, UHA troops launched an offensive in the main direction and active hostilities throughout the Polish-Ukrainian front. In a message dated February 17, 1919, the UHA Press Bureau noted: «It was very difficult to fight our troops in the West of Lviv, along the Horodok–Peremyshl railway. The battles were fought on that day with success for us, but on the very same night, the Poles sent strong reserves from Peremyshl and Mostysky to Sudova Vyshnia in the evening... Our bravery kept several occupied places, such as Vovchukhy, Bar, Dovhomostyska, Dmytrovychi, Stoiantysi»¹².

Simultaneously with O. Stanymir's sotnias (hundreds) successfully advanced the 1st Kurin (unit) of the 1st Regiment of the 1st Brigade of USS, the so-called «Kurin of death» under the command of Lieutenant O. Ivanovych. As a Sergeant Major V. Kryvous recalled, during the offensive in the fierce fighting, the sich riflemen rejected the Poles in the Vovchukhy–Dolynian district and successfully repelled several of their counter-attacks. When a temporary truce with the Poles was announced on February 24, it affected «all shooters, subordinates, and officers very depressingly. Everyone was upset and unhappy because the armistice had been causing our army harm so far. Before the truce, our combat operations were usually successful, while the enemy was losing, we went ahead, gained territory. We were growing in strength, and the enemy's response was weakening. We fully understand that under cover of the truce, there is hostile treachery, cunning and dishonest game of delaying, and, most importantly, the use of quiet time to consolidate their damaged forces in Lviv and other fronts»¹³.

As of February 24, 1919, at the part of the main offensive direction – K. Hofman's group – the front line was formed as follows: the Kurin from the 8th Sambir Brigade, headed by Sotnyk (company commander) O. Stanymir, kept Poriche–Gruntove–Noigof–Uhertsi Nezabytovski–Stodilky line; the kurin of Lieutenant O. Ivanovych from the 1st USS Brigade, reinforced by two Kolomyia sotnias, became entrenched in the occupied villages on the Dolyniany–Vovchukhy line; the kurin of Lieutenant I. Hladylovych kept Myliatyn–Bar–Dovhomostyska line. The artillerymen of two regiments of the Dnieper Cannon Brigade helped them to repel the attacks of the Poles. Taking into account the situation in other parts of the front and in Lviv itself, I. Karpynets, based on V. Hupert's conclusions, made the right conclusion: «The situation of the Poles became more and more catastrophic...»¹⁴.

¹¹ Омелянович-Павленко М. Спогади українського командарма. Київ, 2002. С. 132–133.

¹² Република. 1919. 22 лютого. С. 1.

¹³ Станимир О. Моя участь у Визвольних змаганнях. Торонто, 1966. С. 46.

¹⁴ Карпинець І. Галичина: військова історія 1914–1921. С. 146.

Taking advantage of the success of the first phase of the Vovchukhiv offensive, the West Ukrainian People's Republic government stepped up its diplomatic activities¹⁵. Through the UPR delegation that went to Paris, President Ye. Petrushevych pinned his hopes on the Entente and the United States, and in his appeals and notes, he proposed to influence Poland to end the Polish-Ukrainian war. However, the Western countries' sympathies were on Poland's side. In particular, France was highly interested in getting Warsaw as a strong ally in the confrontation with Germany and a reliable barrier against the entry of Bolshevism into Europe.

Making sure that the delegation of the Paris Peace Conference, the leadership of Poland, and the command of the Polish troops of the Halychyna Front acted together, M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko on February 28, 1919, stated in a problematic geopolitical situation: «With the feeling of grievous insult for the blood of our brothers, for the holy memory of the officers, riflemen, and cossacks who have died for the freedom and national honor, the Supreme Command has to continue the war with the enemy...»¹⁶. These decisions of the West Ukrainian People's Republic government and NK UHA were entirely consistent with the mood of people and army personnel. During the same period, according to an agreement between J. Pilsudski and G. Clemenceau, in the winter of 1919, the formation of the Polish army under the command of the French General J. Haller and a group of generals and officers took place in France¹⁷.

On March 6, 1919, Colonel H. Kossak gathered in Hoshany a meeting of unit commanders that were supposed to participate in the offensive. He placed the command of the operation on the main direction of the blow on Lieutenant Colonel A. Kravs. The plan was to create three battle groups: «Horodok» (Commander O. Stanymir) consisting of two kurins, «Vovchukhy» – 3 kurins of sich riflemen, headed by O. Bukshovanyi, «Sudova Vyshnia» – 5 kurins (A. Liskevych). After the start of the operation with a joint strike on the Horodok by the Vovchukhy and Horodok groups with the Yaniv Brigade of the 1st Corps, he had to take this powerful key point of Poles¹⁸.

The Sudova Vyshnia Group covered their western flanks from possible counter-attack by the Poles. The operation was scheduled on the morning of March 8. To prevent enemy revealing the direction of the main strike of UHA units, General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko ordered on the morning of March 5, to resume active actions along the 300-kilometer front, including in Lviv suburbs. As a result of the powerful shelling of Lviv by long-range artillery of the 2nd Halychanian Corps, large ammunition depots in the city were blown up near the Lviv railway station. Later, Polish military historians wrote that the Halychanians could occupy Lviv that day¹⁹.

On the eve of the second phase of the Vovchukhiv operation – the attack on March 8, by a strike group of the 3rd Corps under the command of A. Kravs, the Polish troops were ahead of the Ukrainians – went on the offensive. On the morning of March 7, after a lot of

¹⁵ Кучик О. Українське питання в зовнішній політиці держав Антанти (1917–1920 рр.). Львів, 2004. С. 119–121.

¹⁶ Омелянович-Павленко М. Спогади українського командарма. С. 151–152.

¹⁷ Центр хранения историко-документальных коллекций (далі – ЦХИДК). Ф. 471. Оп. 1. Д. 83. Л. 39–55.

¹⁸ Історія українського війська / Б. Гнатевич та ін. Львів, 1936. С. 501.

¹⁹ Шанковський Л. Українська Галицька Армія. С. 132–133.

artillery training, V. Fara's group from Cherliany district struck an attack in the direction of Uhorets against the kurins of Horodok Group. Its commander O. Stanyimir caused the fire of his artillery group, which caused considerable loss to the Poles, and when the Poles stopped, the Halychianians counter-attacked.

While pursuing the retreating Poles, the kurins of Stanyimir and Lishchynskiyi reached Horodok and occupied its outskirts. Another Polish group of J. Becker used dense fog to attack the Halychianians positions and occupied Bar and Dolyniany. However, H. Holynskiyi's Hutsulian kurin and I. Ivanytskyi's Sich kurin, which were thrown in a counter-attack by A. Kravs, reclaim Dolyniany and Vovchukhy. Becker's group was forced to retreat to Sudova Vyshnia. During this operation, Halychianians took 200 prisoners, 3 cannons, 7 machine guns²⁰.

The next day, on March 8, the Sudova Vyshnia Group widely took a railway, destroyed one track, while another one was captured by Polish armored trains and came closer to Sudova Vyshnia. The situation at the front caused panic among Polish generals. After an unsuccessful attempt to break through Zhovkva to Lviv, General Romer advised T. Rozvadovskiyi to leave Lviv as soon as possible. The General Staff in Warsaw was preparing the order. But luckily for J. Pilsudski, an armed conflict on the Polish–Czech border ended, which allowed him to send fresh troops to the Halychyna Front immediately²¹.

On March 9–11, 1919, the main efforts of the 3rd Halychianian Corps focused on the assault on Horodok, where the Ukrainians occupied part of the suburbs and the railway station area. In these conditions, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kravs appealed to the Corps Commander with a reasonable proposal to stop the hopeless frontal assault on Horodok. He suggested that the main strike should be directed at the Sudova Vyshnia–Peremyshl, by overthrowing the combatant 1st USS Brigade and intensifying the fighting of Khyriv and Krukenychi groups in Peremyshl direction. Later, war participants and Halychianian military historians confidently said that this maneuver would save the Vovchukhiv operation and could be a turning point in the war²².

The Polish command has taken urgent measures to prevent such a situation near Sudova Vyshnia. On March 9, J. Pilsudski appointed a new commander of the Halychyna Front, General V. Ivashkevych. He was instructed to remove parts of the 3rd Corps from the railway on the Sudova Vyshnia–Horodok section by a powerful counter-attack and unlock Lviv. The new commander received fresh forces. On March 10, from Peremyshl to Sudova Vyshnia arrived a squad of General F. Aleksandrovych – about 3 thousand soldiers. On March 12, came reinforcement to the group in Sudova Vyshnia – Colonel D. Konarzhevskiyi's Group of 4 thousand soldiers and officers was tasked with counter-striking in the direction of Horodok²³.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Kravs found out about the formation of a powerful group of Polish troops near Sudova Vyshnia and aware of the danger to his units on the left flank immediately addressed the Corps Commander Colonel H. Kossak with the proposal to stop the hopeless assault on Horodok and strengthen its area. However, with the support of General

²⁰ Литвин М. Українсько-польська війна 1918–1919 рр. С. 342.

²¹ Там само.

²² Там само. С. 343.

²³ Там само.

M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko, the Corps Commander conversely threw parts from under Sudova Vyshnia on the assault of Horodok. In these circumstances, A. Kravs took off his duties as the commander of a strike group and the commander of the 8th Sambir Brigade. He was replaced by General V. Henbachov, who had just arrived from the UPR Army.

On March 13, a Polish group from Sudova Vyshnia went on a decisive offensive. Numerical superiority units of General F. Aleksandrovych attacked positions of the Sudova Vyshnia Group, which for two days had to withstand the onslaught of Poles and suffered heavy casualties. During the bloody battles of March 13–16, the Poles succeeded in occupying Bortiatyn, Dovhomostyska, and Kutu. On March 17, a fresh Polish Poznan Group of Colonel D. Konarzhevskiyi (5 infantry chambers and 4 cannon batteries – 4,2 thousand soldiers) arrived here and immediately attacked the Halychanians positions²⁴.

As a result of these battles, the UHA's Sudova Vyshnia Group was defeated, and a dangerous gap in defense of the Halychanians was formed. Only now, Colonel H. Kossak, with the permission of the NK UHA, stopped hopeless attacks of Horodok and began to throw over the kurins of 1st USS Brigade in the Sudova Vyshnia direction. But it was too late. Also, they were put into the battle not together, but separately, and this did not bring real benefits.

Aware of the crucial importance of the battle in the Sudova Vyshnia–Horodok area during the war, on March 18, General V. Ivashkevych projected his kurins to Sudova Vyshnia and took over management of operations. On the same day, on the offensive by groups of Aleksandrovych and Konarzhevskiyi in the direction of Horodok, the Poles took Rodatychi, Vovchukhy, and continued their movement to Horodok. At the same time, on March 19, on the birthday of J. Pilsudski, the Horodok Group of Colonel V. Sikorskiy went on the offensive. It pushed the Ukrainians to the border of the Poriche–Gruntove–Uhertsy–Dobriany–Nyklovychi line.

Thus, the Poles repelled the Lviv–Peremyshl railway and occupied the southern territory, from where they could prepare new strikes on the troops of the 3rd Corps. They simultaneously intensified the fighting in the north of Lviv – Berbetskiy's and Romer's groups occupied Yavoriv, Yaniv, Maheriv, and significantly pushed O. Mykytko's Corps to the east. On the south wing, the Poles' attempts to move east failed – parts of the UHA successfully repulsed them. On the initiative of Paris, at the end of March, peace talks between Ukrainian-Polish delegations began with the participation of a representative of Paris, General F. Kernan, Captains Y. Bachman, and S. Reisler. However, their peacekeeping efforts were worthless. Poles, which had just started a successful offensive, having intensified by parts from central Poland, refused to negotiate with Ukrainians²⁵. It should be noted that after the failure of negotiations, General F. Kernan reported to President W. Wilson that the Ukrainians supported the peacekeeping initiatives of Paris. In contrast, the Poles, with the support of France, totally ignored them. Therefore, fighting at the front was stopped. The Vovchukhiv offensive of UHA was over²⁶.

Analyzing the reasons of the Halychyna's army failure in the Vovchukhiv operation, they should be divided into internal and external. L. Shankovskiy saw the main reason for

²⁴ ЦХИДК. Ф. 471. Оп. 1. Д. 2. Л. 40.

²⁵ Нариси з історії дипломатії України / під ред. В. А. Смолія. Київ, 2001. С. 362.

²⁶ ЦХИДК. Ф. 471. Оп. 1. Д. 2. Л. 52.

the failure in the strategic plan of the NK UHA, which the commanders stubbornly adhered to. They refused to hear right proposals of the front commanders, in particular, Colonel A. Kravs – after leaving the front units of the strike group on the railroad – to take Sudova Vyshnia and advanced to the West to Peremyshl. On March 8–9, the Halychanians were quite capable of defeating the demoralized Polish group of Becker in Sudova Vyshnia and developing an offensive up to Sian and capture Peremyshl²⁷.

Unfortunately, the NK UHA focused its attention on a different direction – Horodok–Lviv. The futile and unpromising storm of Horodok in February–March distracted significant forces of the army, which was worth throwing on Peremyshl. The forces of the 2nd Corps, whose crews stayed in trenches, and the 1st Corps, except the 10th Yaniv Brigade, were not successfully used. Military historians, in particular O. Kliuchenko, rightly observed, the Halychyna's army was not yet ready to make a large-scale maneuver war that the Halychanian brigades of the 1st and 2nd Corps were aimlessly aiming and standing near Lviv. They should have acted boldly on the operational flanks of the Ukrainian-Polish front, threatened the flanks and rear of the advancing Polish groups, liberated territory of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, and organized mobilization on it to enlist the army. However, O. Kliuchenko did not take into account that for a maneuver war, it is necessary to have a sufficiently numerous, well-armed, and trained following the strategy army, which the Halychyna's army lacked²⁸.

At the same time, the NK UHA did not use the moment of Poles panic retreat in the first stage of the Vovchukhiv operation, when it was worth throwing on the Peremyshl, Krukenychi, Hlyboka, Khyriv groups who were able in that situation to go to Sian and take part in the storm of Peremyshl. «So tragically ended the greatest act of Ukrainian weapons during the ½ months of competitions, a case that cost much blood and great effort», – summed up the result of the Vovchukhiv operation O. Dumin. In addition, the troops of the 2nd Corps with a decisive attack on Lviv in times of great panic in February–March were quite capable of liberating the capital, which was even acknowledged by an officer of the Polish General Staff Korytowski, who stated that «the Ukrainians had the opportunity to win Lviv almost without a shot»²⁹.

One of the important reasons for the failure was the failure of the leadership of the state and the army to utilize mobilization reserves fully. Not all Halychanian men capable of carrying weapons had been mobilized into the ranks of the UHA. General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko acknowledged that at least 50,000 military personnel or capable of service are in the rear. When Minister of Defense D. Vitovskyi arrived in Vienna on his way to the conference, he saw many Halychanian officers wandering the streets and cafes. «At the front, chetari and khorunzhi command hundreds, and here the troopers stroll along the Viennese streets, “gentlemen Ukrainian majors and captains”», he wrote indignantly at the head of the UHA National Assembly in Vienna³⁰.

²⁷ ЦХИДК. Ф. 471. Оп. 1. Д. 2. Л. 52.

²⁸ Ключенко О. Генеральна булава УГА. *Літопис Червоної Калини*. 1934. Ч. 7–8. С. 24–26.

²⁹ Думін О. Армія ЗОУНР (УГА). *Українська загальна енциклопедія*. Львів; Станіславів; Коломия, 1934. Т. 3. С. 731.

³⁰ Литвин М. Українсько-польська війна 1918–1919 рр. С. 345.

For external reasons, the defeat of the UHA in the Vovchukhiv operation, most military historians and memoirists, as one of the main ones, attributed to the intervention of the Entente countries in the Ukrainian-Polish war with their pro-Polish policies. This is evidenced even by the moment of intervention in February 1919, when during the Vovchukhiv offensive, the Ukrainians achieved considerable success and could reverse the course of the Ukrainian-Polish war in their favor, liberate Lviv and clear the territory of the West Ukrainian People's Republic from the Polish invaders. The Barthelemy Commission, with its proposals at Khodoriv negotiations, confirmed that it upholds Poland's interests. The interruption she initiated in the fighting allowed the Poles to significantly strengthen their troops in the Halychyna Front and move in March to a counter-offensive, which negated the achievement of the Vovchukhiv operation of the UHA.

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Ярослав МАРЧЕНКО

кандидат історичних наук

професор кафедри ТСД

Національної академії сухопутних військ

ім. гетьмана Петра Сагайдачного

ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7259-8521>

e-mail: jaroslavmarchenko@ukr.net

ВОВЧУХІВСЬКА ОПЕРАЦІЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ГАЛИЦЬКОЇ АРМІЇ (1919): ПЕРЕДУМОВИ, ПЕРЕБІГ, НАСЛІДКИ

Зазначено, що утворення Західноукраїнської Народної Республіки (ЗУНР) у листопаді 1918 р. стало закономірним наслідком багатолітньої боротьби галицьких українців за державність. Констатовано, що у складних умовах розгорнутої Польщею польсько-української війни 1918–1919 рр. здійснено державне та військове будівництво, зокрема встановлені тісні відносини з Українською Народною Республікою (УНР), реорганізовано Українську Галицьку армію (УГА), яка набула європейських рис і стала здатною на збройний захист ЗУНР. Доведено, що на відміну від Польської держави, військовий потенціал українців був значно слабшим, але все ж яскравим виявом боєздатності УГА стала Вовчухівська стратегічна наступальна операція у лютому–березні 1919 р., яка поставила польські війська у Львові зокрема й Галичині загалом у надзвичайно складну ситуацію.

Проаналізовано передумови Вовчухівської операції, її перебіг, визначено причини поразки УГА. Констатовано, що наступальна стратегічна операція УГА в лютому 1919 р. була спричинена двома чинниками: значним зміцненням збройних сил ЗУНР внаслідок реорганізації, зростанням боєздатності, готовності до рішучих наступальних операцій та підвищенням морального й бойового стану особового складу внаслідок наполегливої роботи керівних структур. Описано воєнні успіхи українських військ, які спричинили тривогу та паніку у Варшаві. Зазначено, що перерву в бойових діях, організовану місією Антанти, успішно використало командування польської армії, яке підсилило війська на Галицькому фронті резервами з-за кордону. На конкретних прикладах показано, що навесні 1919 р. бригади УГА були змушені чинити опір силам поляків, які переважали, через що незабаром втратили здобуті переваги наступальної операції.

Ключові слова: ЗУНР, УГА, Польська держава, Вовчухівська операція, польсько-українська війна.

НАЦІОНАЛЬНА АКАДЕМІЯ НАУК УКРАЇНИ
ІНСТИТУТ УКРАЇНОЗНАВСТВА ім. І. КРИП'ЯКЕВИЧА

НОВІТНЯ ДОБА

ВИПУСК 6

Новітня доба / гол. ред. Михайло Романюк; НАН України, Інститут українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича. Львів, 2018. Вип. 6. 264 с.

У збірнику представлено дослідження з новітньої української та світової історії за період від Першої світової війни і до сьогодення. Наголошено на закономірностях й особливостях розвитку суспільно-політичних і націєтворчих процесів в Україні у контексті історії європейських народів, зокрема становища українського суспільства в умовах тоталітарних режимів. Розкрито особливості українського визвольного руху, воєнної історії, формування державних інституцій, роль культури у становленні громадянського суспільства, вивчення джерел та історичної біографістики.

Contemporary era / [resp. ed. Mykhailo Romaniuk; I. Krypiakievych Institute of Ukrainian Studies NAS of Ukraine. Lviv, 2018. Issue 6. 264 p.

The collection presents studies on modern Ukrainian and world history from the First World War to the present. Emphasis is placed on the regularities and features of the development of socio-political and nation-building processes in Ukraine in the context of the European nations' history, in particular the position of Ukrainian society under totalitarian regimes. The features of the Ukrainian liberation movement, military history, formation of state institutions, the role of culture in the development of civil society, the study of sources and historical biography are revealed.

Рекомендувала до друку вчена рада
Інституту українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича НАН України
(протокол № 5 від 20.12.2018 р.)

ГОЛОВНИЙ РЕДАКТОР

Романюк Михайло Васильович, к.і.н. (Україна)

РЕДАКЦІЙНА КОЛЕГІЯ:

Голембійовська-Тобіаш Анета (*Gołębiowska-Tobiasz Aneta*), dr (Польща)

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Цецик Ярослав Петрович, к.і.н., доц. (Україна)

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